Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy
Volume 2

Issue 3

Article 6

March 2014

Taking New Steps Against Digital Sampling: The Sixth Circuit Lays
Down the Law on Digital Sampling, but Will it Really Improve
Industry Practices?
Kelly Randall

Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Randall, Kelly (2014) "Taking New Steps Against Digital Sampling: The Sixth Circuit Lays Down the Law on
Digital Sampling, but Will it Really Improve Industry Practices?," Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy: Vol.
2 : Iss. 3 , Article 6.
Available at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp/vol2/iss3/6

This Policy Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Volunteer, Open Access, Library Journals (VOL
Journals), published in partnership with The University of Tennessee (UT) University Libraries. This article has been
accepted for inclusion in Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy by an authorized editor. For more information,
please visit https://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp.

Taking New Steps Against Digital Sampling: The Sixth Circuit Lays Down the Law
on Digital Sampling, but Will it Really Improve Industry Practices?
Cover Page Footnote
J.D. Candidate 2007, University of Tennessee College of Law; B.Mus. 2000, Vanderbilt University, Blair
School of Music. Author also served as Editor-in-Chief of the TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY.

This policy notes is available in Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy: https://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp/vol2/iss3/6

2:3

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY

523

TAKING NEW STEPS AGAINST DIGITAL SAMPLING:
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT LAYS DOWN THE LAW ON DIGITAL
SAMPLING, BUT WILL IT REALLY IMPROVE INDUSTRY
PRACTICES?

Kelly Randall*

I.

In Search of an Infringement Rule

In Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films,' the
Sixth Circuit tackled an issue that has been plaguing the
music industry for nearly two decades. Digital sampling is
a staple of the rap and hip-hop creative process, but there is
very little precedent on or clarity about how to determine if
sampling infringes on a sound recording copyright. In
Bridgeport I, the defendant, No Limit Films, released the
film I Got the Hook Up (Hook Up) and included the song
"100 Miles and Runnin' ("100 Miles") on the film
soundtrack . 2 As with many typical rap songs, "100 Miles"
sampled from another song. The plaintiff, Westbound
Records, Inc. ("Westbound"), claimed co-ownership of the
sound recording copyright to the sampled song, "Get Off
Your Ass and Jam" ("Get Off"), by George Clinton, Jr. and
the Funkadelics. 3 Although No Limit Films obtained an
oral license from the co-owners
of "100 Miles" to use the
song in the film soundtrack,4 Westbound claimed that "100

J.D. Candidate 2007, University of Tennessee College of Law;
B.Mus. 2000, Vanderbilt University, Blair School of Music. Author
also served as Editor-in-Chief of the TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW &
POLICY.
1230 F. Supp. 2d 830 (M.D. Tenn. 2002) [hereinafter BridgeportI].
2Id.at 833.
3 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390, 393 (6th
Cir. 2004) [hereinafter BridgeportIl].
4Bridgeport1,230 F. Supp. 2d at 833.
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5
Miles" contained an unauthorized sampling of "Get Off."
The process to determine whether digital sampling
amounts to copyright infringement is obscured by many
factors. Since many sampling cases are settled out-ofcourt, 6 the scarcity of case law does not provide a definitive
road map for making this determination. While the courts
are still in the evolutionary stages of creating a standard of
analysis for infringement created by sampling, 7 the lack of
clear guidelines or rules further complicates the process. In
light of an increase in litigation regarding digital sampling
and copyright infringement, the Sixth Circuit addressed the
need to clarify "what constitutes actionable infringement
with regard to the digital sampling of copyrighted sound
recordings." 8 In Bridgeport II, the Sixth Circuit reversed
the district court's grant of summary judgment to No Limit
Films and established a new bright light rule for defining
sound recording copyright infringement. 9 The court held
that when someone digitally samples, it is a physical taking
of another's work and no further analysis, such as de
minimis or substantial similarity test, is required.' 0
The purpose of this case synopsis is to demonstrate
Bridgeport's departure from the traditional methods of
evaluating copyright infringement claims, as well as its
potential effect on the music industry and the courts that
review those cases. While this case addressed other issues
on appeal, this synopsis will focus primarily on
Westbound's claim against No Limit Films and the court's
establishment of a new bright line rule. Moreover, this
synopsis will not include the technical details of digital
5

Id. at 838.

6 Susan

J. Latham, Newton v. Diamond: Measuring the Legitimacy of

Unauthorized Compositional Sampling-A Clue Illuminated and
Obscured, 26 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 119, 124 (2003).
7id.

8BridgeportII, 383 F.3d at 397.
910Id.at 395.
1d. at 395, 399.
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sampling, as they are discussed in an abundance of
scholarly articles written on the topic. 11 While this
decision emphasizes the need for the new bright line rule
and "ease of enforcement,"12 it represents a broad departure
from the traditional model of determining whether digital
sampling amounts to copyright infringement. Furthermore,
such a departure may not result in the outcome that the
court anticipated. Rather, this decision may create a greater
divide between the analyses utilized by the Sixth Circuit
and other circuit courts of appeals for copyright
infringement cases.
II.

Development of Copyright Infringement
Analyses
A.

Groundwork for Analyzing Infringement

Although Baxter v. MCA 13 involved only a musical
composition copyright infringement, it provides a genesis
for the analyses used to determine copyright infringement.
In that case, the plaintiff was the sole copyright owner of
the musical composition "Joy,"' 14 which he claimed
composer John Williams copied for use in the "Theme
from E.T."' 15 After the district court found that the two
works were not substantially similar,' 6 the Ninth Circuit
laid the groundwork for analyzing a copyright infringement
claim. A claimant must prove (1) copyright ownership, and
17
(2) that the defendant copied a "protectible expression."'
To prove copying, a plaintiff may use circumstantial
evidence that (a) the defendant had access to the original
" Id. at 401.
1Id. at 398.
13812 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1987).
14Id. at 422.
"Id.
at 423.
16
id.

17id.

3
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work before his work was created, and (b) "substantial

similarity of both general ideas and expression between the8
copyrighted work and the defendant's work."'
Furthermore, a plaintiff may also show a "'striking
similarity' between the works" to infer copying, where
there is no evidence of access. 19
In reviewing the case, the Baxter court applied an
"intrinsic" test of substantial similarity by relying on the
20
reaction of an ordinary lay person hearing the works.
Although the court used this analysis technique to
determine that the two works should be heard by the jury, 21
it rejected the defendant's argument that a similarity as
22
minimal as a six-note progression is not copyrightable.
In fact, the court highlighted the lack of a bright line rule
constitutes
what amount of copying
regarding
infringement. 23 Rather than opt to solve the problem by
establishing a rule, the Ninth Circuit left that determination
to the jury,2 4 preferring to determine infringement as a
question of fact rather than law.
B.

Simplifying the Analysis for Unauthorized
Use

Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Brothers
Records, Inc. is one of the earliest sampling cases
involving unauthorized use. The defendant, artist Biz
Markie, sought the clearance to use the plaintiffs work,
"Alone Again (Naturally)," in his composition, "Alone
18 Id.
19Id.

'0Id.
at 424.
21
1d. at 425.
22/id.
23

id.

24

id.
780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).

25

4
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Again. ' 26 However, his record label released the album
including "Alone Again" before the defendant could obtain
the necessary clearances. 2 The court used the defendant's
own actions in attempting to obtain a license, then
subsequently releasing an album with a song that included
an unlicensed sample, to prove that the defendant knew he
28
was violating the plaintiffs rights as a copyright holder.
Essentially, the court used the defendant's own knowledge
of unauthorized sampling to prove infringement, thus
simplifying the analysis to a process similar to the later
developed Bridgeportrule.
C.

Defining Multiple Analyses for More
Complex Infringement

Two years later, a district court in nearby New
Jersey decided a more complicated sampling case using a
less clear-cut approach. 29 In Jarvis v. A&M Records, the
defendant used sampled portions of the plaintiffs
composition "The Music's Got Me" in his composition
"Get Dumb! (Free Your Body).",30 The court established a
three step process to prove copyright infringement, in
which the plaintiff must prove that (1) he is a valid
copyright owner; (2) the "defendant copied a protectible
expression"; and (3) the "copying is substantial enough to
' 1
constitute improper appropriation of plaintiffs work.'
Similar to the Baxter court's analysis, the Jarvis court
found that without the defendant's admission of unlicensed
sampling, copying can be inferred if the defendant had
access to the original work and the defendant's work is
2

6Id. at

27Id. at

184.
185.

28 id.
29 Jarvis v. A&M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1993).
3
°1d. at 286.
31
Id. at 288.
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32
substantially similar to the plaintiffs.
In Jarvis, however, the defendant admitted to
unauthorized use of the sample, 33 and the court moved to
the third step in its analysis. The court analogized digital
sampling to "taping the original composition and reusing it
in another context." 34 This analogy allowed the court to
apply Professor Nimmer's doctrine of "fragmented literal
similarity," where "literal, verbatim similarity" exists
between the two works. 35 Digital sampling by definition is
a flawless example of "fragmented literal similarity." To
this end, the court further explained that "fragmented literal
similarity" infringement may decrease the value of the
original work even when only a small, but qualitatively
significant portion of the work was copied.36 While the
court found that both quantitatively and qualitatively
significant portions of a work can be protectible
expressions, it ultimately examined the infringing work's
effect on the original work's value to determine unlawful
appropriation. 37 On the other hand, the court noted some
material may not be "sufficiently original and/or novel"
and, thus, is non-copyrightable,38 but a "sufficiently
distinctive" work is copyrightable. 39 Jarvis illuminated
four of the main analyses for determining copyright
infringement: (1) substantial similarity, (2) fragmented
literal similarity, (3) quantitative/qualitative, and (4)
originality.

32

Id. at 289.

33 id.
34

Id. at 286.
Id. at 289.
36
Id.at 291.
35

37 id.

38id.
39

Id.

at 292.

6
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D.

Compacting the Analyses, But
Infringement Still Remains a Jury Question

Nearly a decade later, in Williams v. Broadus,40 the
court evaluated and compacted several analyses to
determine if sampling is unlawful.4 '
Plaintiff Marlon
Williams ("Marley Marl") sampled a portion of Otis
Redding's song "Hard to Handle" for his song "The
Symphony" without obtaining the proper permission from
the copyright owner. 42 Ten years after the release of
Williams' album, the defendant, Calvin Broadus ("Snoop
Dogg") sampled some lyrics and music from "The
Symphony" for his own song, "Ghetto Symphony. 4' 3 The
defendant argued that due to Williams' own unauthorized
sampling, the plaintiff did not have a valid copyright, and
therefore, could not meet the first step in a copyright
infringement analysis. 44 While the Copyright Act does not
protect a derivative work that has unlawfully used other
material,4 5 a "work is not derivative simply because it
borrows from a pre-existing work.",4 6 Rather, a work is
derivative if it infringes on the original copyright holder's
right to create a derivative work himself. 7 To establish
that a derivative work exists, the infringer must have copied
the work and done so to the level of unlawful
appropriation. 48 Once again, the substantial similarity test
is used to prove unlawful appropriation 49 by relying upon

40

No. 99 Civ. 10957 MBM, 2001 WL 984714, at *1 (S.D.N.Y., Aug.

24, 2001).
41id.
42 id.
43id.

44Id

17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1976).
46Williams,
2001 WL 984714, at *2.
47
41

1d.
48id.
49

1d.

at *3.
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50
the ordinary lay listener's response to the two works.
The court further explained that this case is an
example of "fragmented literal similarity," 51 and offered
the de minimis doctrine that some literal copying may be so
quantitatively or qualitatively insignificant that it does not
amount to infringement. 52 The court acknowledged that its
de minimis substantial similarity analysis depends on the
significance of the copied material to the-original work.53
After compressing several analyses, the court found that a
material issue of fact remained as to whether the
defendant's sample constituted a significant portion of the
original work, 5 thus continuing to follow the Baxter
precedent that infringement is a question of fact and not of
law.

E.

Filtering Out Sound Recording and
Musical Composition Infringements
1.

The District Court's Approach in
Newton I

In Newton v. Diamond, 5 the court distinguished
between musical composition and sound recording
copyright infringement. The plaintiff was the sole owner of
the musical composition "Choir, ' 56 but did not own the
sound recording copyright after he had licensed it to ECM
Records. 57 The defendants, the Beastie Boys, obtained a
license to sample the sound recording from ECM and used
5

°d"

51

52

id.
1d.

" Id. at *4.
54 id.

55 Newton v. Diamond, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244 (C.D. Cal. 2002)

[hereinafter Newton 1].
1Id. at 1246.

5

57 id.

8
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a six-second long sequence of three notes played over one
sustained note in their song "Pass the Mic." 8 Since the
plaintiff did not have a sound recording copyright
infringement claim, the court first used a process to filter
out the unique characteristics of the sound recording from
the musical composition. 59
The court concluded that a musical composition
copyright "protects only the sound that would invariably
result from" playing the written musical composition, 60 not
necessarily the actual sounds performed.
While the
plaintiffs argument focused on this specific performance
technique, the court applied the following test to filter out
the performance from the composition by asking (1) what
is "unique" about the plaintiffs performance, and (2)
whether the defendant's own creation of a similar threenote sequence would infringe upon the musical
composition copyright. 62 Next, the court employed the
originality analysis, explaining that "not every element of a
song is per se protected" and that copyright extends only to
the "original and non-trivial" elements of a work.6 3 The
court countered the plaintiffs focus on the originality of
the three-note sequence with prior case law. Similar cases
involving less than six notes were successfully protected
only where the notes were "qualitatively distinctive" when
accompanied by lyrics, went to the "heart of the
composition," were repeated frequently within the lyrics,
and were analyzed in both the sound recording and the
written composition. 64 After using this filtering process,
the court found that any originality in the six-second

58M."
59
d. at 1249.
60

Id.at 1251.

61 Id. at 1252.
62id.
63

Id. at 1253.

64Md. at 1254.
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sample comes from the sound recording, 65 and further held
three-note sequence was not
that a small, common
66
copyright.
by
protected
Lastly, the court employed the de minimis analysis.
While the court acknowledged that the three-note sequence
is not protected by copyright, it contended that the
defendant's use of the sample was nonetheless de
minimis. 67 Since a de minimis sample is not substantially
similar enough to be recognizable by the average
audience, 68 the court adopted a quantitative/qualitative
approach by asking whether the defendant's use of
quantitative or qualitative elements of the original work
"rises to the level of unlawful appropriation." 6 9 While a
quantitative analysis emphasizes the amount of material
copied,7 ° the qualitative analysis focuses on the
significance of the copied material to the original work.7 '
Ultimately, the court noted that the qualitative analysis
depends on whether someone might recognize the source of
the material in question when performed outside the
context of the original work.72 Although a de minimis
analysis was not necessary with this particular sample, the
court's elaboration of the analysis began to solve the
problems associated with the lack of useful guidelines to
determine copyright infringement by digital sampling.
2.

The Court of Appeals Refines the
Process in Newton II

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
Id. at 1256.

65

id.
67
6

id.

68

1 d. at 1256-57.

69
1d.
70

at 1257.

d.

71

id.

72Id. at 1258.
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court's holding in Newton I that the defendant's use of the
sample was de minimis.73 However, Newton II approached
the de minimis analysis in a different manner. Here, the
Ninth Circuit, like the trial court, began with a process to
"filter out" the elements associated with the sound
recording to address only the elements infringing upon the
musical composition.74 The court then incorporated the
substantial similarity, "fragmented literal similarity," and
the quantitative/qualitative analyses to establish that "the
substantiality of the similarity is measured by considering
the qualitative and quantitative significance of the copied
75
portion in relation to the plaintiffs work as a whole."
The court determined that since the three-note sequence
appeared only once in "Choir" and was not any more
significant than other sections of the work, the sampled
portion was
"neither quantitatively nor qualitatively
' 76
"
significant.
Therefore, the Newton II court concluded that the
works were not substantially similar and the sample was de
minimis because the ordinary listener would not "discern
Newton's hand as a composer apart from his talent as a
performer" in the Beastie Boys' sample. 77 While the
dissenting judge acknowledged the analyses presented by
the majority were correct, she explained that a reasonable
jury could find substantial similarity in the works, and
disagreed with the grant of summary judgment for the
defendant.78

73 Newton v. Diamond, 349 F.3d 591, 592 (9th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter

Newton
I1].
74
/d. at 595.
75
1Id. at 596.
76
/d. at 597.
77 Id. at 598.
78 id.
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Summary

Steadily, courts have established a framework for
determining what constitutes copyright infringement in
digital sampling cases. Borrowing from other infringement
analyses, courts have many options to evaluate digital
sampling's effect on copyright, while generally resolving
the issue as a question of fact. Such painstaking efforts to
set forth precedent should not be taken lightly. Relying
more on law review articles than case law, however, the
Sixth Circuit chose to depart from this precedent rather
than add to it.
11l.

Bridgeport's Procedural History
A.

The District Court Takes the Anticipated
Approach and Follows Precedent in
Bridgeport I

In Bridgeport I, the district court incorporated all of
the analyses, relying heavily upon the substantial similarity
and quantitative/qualitative analyses to find that the
defendant's use of the sample was de minimis and thus not
actionable. The court first focused on the originality of the
sample, concluding that a jury could find that the
arpeggiated chord from "Get Off' was sufficiently
"original and creative" and therefore a protectible
expression. 79 Next, the court pointed out that the de
minimis analysis balances the interests of the copyright
holders against the potentially "stifling effect" that strict
enforcement of copyright laws may have on the artistic
expression of new works. 8
In addition, the court
highlighted that the analysis is complicated by the scarcity
of case law on digital sampling and the "lack of a clear road
79

Bridgeport1, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 839.
"I1d. at 840.
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81
map for de minimis analyses."
After finding that the de minimis analysis was a
derivative of the substantial similarity test,8 2 the court
explained that applying either the quantitative/qualitative or
the "fragmented literal similarity" approaches used by other
courts would also show that this particular instance of
sampling "does not rise to the level of legally cognizable
appropriation."' 8 3 Therefore, the Bridgeport I court found
that the sampled material was a "mere fraction" of the
plaintiffs original work and therefore quantitatively
insignificant. 84
While reviewing the qualitative
significance of the sample, the court found that the mood,
tone, and purpose were not substantially similar enough
that an ordinary lay listener would recognize the
appropriation. 85 In a final note, the court emphasized that
copyright law's purpose is to "deter wholesale plagiarism,"
while striking a balance "between protecting an artist's
interests, and depriving other artists of the building blocks
of future works."8 6 Therefore, the court attempted to weigh
those factors when dismissing the plaintiffs claims after
finding a lack of substantial similarity and that the sampled
material was de minimis. As expected, the district court
respected the precedent, evaluated the case under every
analysis available from case law, and found that the issue
was a question of fact. 87

id.
Id. at 841.
83 id.
81

2

84 Id.
85

ld. at 842.

86 id.
8
7 Following the Sixth Circuit's decision, the court granted a rehearing

based on the defendant's petition and an amicus brief filed by the
Recording Industry Association of America in support of that petition,
which resulted in a few changes to section II of the decision. See
Bridgeport Music Inc. v. Dimension Films, 401 F.3d 647 (6th Cir.
2004) [hereinafter BridgeportRehearing]. Although this case synopsis
focuses primarily on section H of the decision, the amendments either

13
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The Sixth Circuit Makes Its Own Rules in
Bridgeport H

In Bridgeport 11,88 the Sixth Circuit took a less
analytical approach to the issue of whether digital sampling
constitutes copyright infringement. The court created a
new bright line rule to address the district court's concern
with the scarcity of case law and general lack of clear
guidelines for the de minimis analysis. 89 However, the
Sixth Circuit departed from the district court's decision and
accepted the plaintiffs argument that a de minimis, or
substantial similarity, analysis was not necessary in cases
where the defendant concedes digital sampling. 90 The
court explained that by adopting this bright line rule, both
the music industry and the courts benefit from the newly
digital sampling
found clarity to determine whether
9
amounts to copyright infringement. 1
In developing the rule, the court first called
92
attention to the statutory language of the Copyright Act,
specifically that the sound recording copyright owner has
the exclusive right to prepare derivative works of the
copyrighted material, including using fixed sounds from the
original recording. 93 The court's interpretation of section
I 14(b) allows a non-copyright holder to simulate or imitate
the sounds in a recording, but prohibits making an actual
copy of the recording, 94 thus protecting the copyrighted

clarify the court's language or include additional footnote material that
has
88 generally little effect on this synopsis.
Bridgeport I, 383 F.3d at 390.
89
BridgeportRehearing,401 F.3d at 840.
90
BridgeportII, 383 F.3d at 395.
at 397.
9'
92 Id.
Id. at 399 (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 114).
93
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 114(a)-(b) (1976).
94
BridgeportII, 383 F.3d at 398.

14
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work without stifling the creativity of others. 95 Since a
sampling license fee could not be higher than either the cost
to reproduce the sounds by the non-copyright holder or the
cost to litigate the issue, the
court explained that the market
96
fee.
the
determine
would
In addition, the court pointed out that "sampling is
never accidental" and that the sampler knows that the
97
process of sampling is "taking another's work product." 98
Further, the court emphasized the value of the sample,
and interpreted the statute as not only prohibiting the
sampling of the whole work, but also smaller portions of
the whole. 99 Although a sample is only a portion of the
whole work, that portion still has value since the sampler
chose that portion to either reduce expenses, add value to
the new recording, or both.'00
In contrast, the court explained that following a de
minimis or substantial similarity analysis is not as
economical as adopting this new bright line rule. 101 In the
interest of the many digital sampling cases pending before
the courts, the new rule would eliminate additional analyses
and allow the courts to decide the cases quickly, efficiently,
and with little variance or error.1 02 The Bridgeport II court
claimed to be less concerned with the rule's judicial
economy and more interested in the benefits to the music
industry by making it cheaper for an artist to license a work
than risk the cost of litigation. 10 3 Yet, with more than 470
similar cases pending from the original litigation, this
bright line rule approach seems more self-serving for the
95

96

97

Id.

1d. at 398-99.
Id. at 399.

98Id.
99Id. at 398.
'00 Id. at 399.
1O1Id.

102
Id.
0
1 3Id.at 399-400.
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court than beneficial to the music industry.
Recognizing that it was setting forth a new rule, the
court attempted to justify establishing its own precedent, as
well as its sharp departure from the traditional analysisbased approach followed by earlier decisions. First, rather
than relying upon judicial precedent, the court followed the
statutory interpretation offered by numerous law review
articles addressing the issue of digital sampling.10 4 Such an
unorthodox approach will likely be criticized and followed
with caution. Second, the court reasoned that a licensing
requirement for digital sampling will in no way stifle
creativity, since several artists and companies already
choose to properly license the sampled material in their
works. 10 5 Third, the court noted that the responsibility of
working out guidelines for proper digital sampling
licensing rests with the record industry and not the
courts. 106 Fourth, the court pointed out that this new rule is
intended to apply only to cases arising after the Bridgeport
II decision and, thus, should not affect any pending or
already litigated cases. 0 7 Lastly, while the court took a
"literal reading approach" to the legislation that was passed
before digital sampling existed, it left any responsibility for
clarifying or updating the law to Congress, particularly
the music industry may prompt such action on
noting that
08
its own. 1
In the end, the Sixth Circuit made digital sampling a
question of law when the defendant admits to the
Although, a taking without
unauthorized sampling.
permission is infringement, the court disposed of the need
for a jury, and thus, presented digital sampling as a strict
As a result, any flexibility in the
liability offense.
Copyright Act and case law that encouraged artistic
4Id. at 400.
105 Id. at 401.
106 id.

107 Id.
1' 8Id. at 401-02.
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expression has been quashed. With strict liability looming,
digital samplers are faced with a choice to license their
sampled material, no matter how insignificant, or face the
consequences.
V.

Is a New Bright Line Rule Really What The
Music Industry Needs?

While the development of this new bright line rule
may appear to provide much needed guidance for assessing
how digital sampling infringes upon copyrighted works, the
rule may not have the desired effects. Although the court
appears to present the rap and hip-hop industry with the
"license or else" ultimatum, strict compliance by that
industry is unlikely. In fact, it might encourage less
obedient behavior and less-than-honest
practices,
particularly among the newer, budding artists. Rising talent
in the music industry rarely is represented by counsel or
well-versed in copyright law. In hopes of one day "making
it" in the industry, up-and-coming artists frequently depend
on a grassroots following, creating and distributing demo
tapes, and performing in public as often as possible. This
approach can lead to the artist's popularity and, in turn, an
increased demand for that artist's work. As money begins
to exchange hands for the artist's recordings, whether
independently as demo tapes and self-produced recordings
or through a professional record company, any digital
sampling in the work has either been long-forgotten or
cannot be removed without significantly altering the work
and potentially lessening the demand. Despite the court's
position that many artists and companies already choose to
properly license their digital samples, those artists and
companies the court identified are already well-established
in the industry, represented by counsel, and therefore can
no longer operate below the radar. Unfortunately, the court
failed to account for the up-and-comer, the grassroots artist,
and the hobbyist, who may all one day become established

17
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artists.
As word of this decision spreads through the
industry, the potential for artists to become less forthright
about their use of digital samples and more creative in
altering the samples beyond any recognition will likely
reach a higher level than ever before. Although the court
offered the suggestion that artists are free to recreate the
sounds in a sound recording themselves by imitating or
simulating the sounds, it fails to recognize that a creative
staple of this genre often involves the use and creative
Artists and
manipulation of other sound recordings.
producers are unlikely to change their creative processes
for the sake of avoiding the hassle or expense of licensing
other works. Just as a slight modification in another area of
strict liability-such as enforcing the speed limit-is not
likely to change most drivers' habits on the highway, this
bright line rule will have little effect on the habits of the
digital sampling community.
After several years of developing and employing
analyses for determining copyright infringement, other
courts may be hesitant to adopt the Sixth Circuit's new
rule. The response from the Second, Third, and Ninth
Circuits could determine the authority of this new rule and
whether they are likely to change their own precedent on
this issue. Especially notable would be the Ninth Circuit's
reaction to this decision after its own de minimis analysis in
Newton II just ten months before BridgeportII. In contrast,
the Eleventh Circuit could emerge as the most willing to
adopt this new rule considering the burgeoning rap and hiphop industry in the Atlanta area and an even greater
scarcity of that circuit's own precedent in Copyright
infringement cases. On the other hand, the increased
influence of the genre's artists and companies in that circuit
could persuade the court to adopt a more sampling-friendly
approach. However, with a surge of copyright holders
filing infringement suits, courts may start adopting the
Sixth Circuit's rule, or a variation thereof, in an effort to
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insure their own judicial economy.

VI.

Conclusion

Only time will tell whether Bridgeport'snew bright
line rule will mean a whole new strict liability approach to
whether digital sampling amounts to copyright
infringement. While rejecting several years of case law
that allowed some sampling within confined circumstances,
the Sixth Circuit's decision prohibits any unlicensed digital
sampling. Amid criticism by some artists and companies,
the decision may have an effect on the industry's behavior,
but perhaps not the exact outcome that the court
envisioned.
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